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Abstract—Software vulnerabilities affect all businesses and research is being done to avoid,
detect or repair them. In this article, we contribute a new technique for automatic vulnerability
fixing. We present a system that uses the rich software development history that can be found
on GitHub to train an AI system that generates patches. We apply sequence-to-sequence
learning on a big dataset of code changes and we evaluate the trained system on real world
vulnerabilities from the CVE database. The result shows the feasibility of using
sequence-to-sequence learning for fixing software vulnerabilities.
A SOFTWARE VULNERABILITY is a weakness
in code that can be exploited by an attacker
to perform unauthorized actions. For example,
one common kind of vulnerability is a buffer
overflow, which allows an attacker to overwrite
a buffer’s boundary and inject malicious code.
Another example is an SQL injection, where
malicious SQL statements are inserted into ex-
ecutable queries. The exploitation of vulnerabil-
ities contributes to the hundreds of billions of
dollars that cybercrime costs the world economy
each year [1].
Each month, thousands of such vulnerabilities
are reported to the Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVE) database. Each one of them
is assigned a unique identifier and category. For
instance, the entry identified by CVE-2019-9208
is a vulnerability in Wireshark which causes a null
pointer exception, and it is categorized as ‘Null
Pointer Dereference’. In October 2019 alone,
1737 vulnerabilities were reported to the National
Vulnerability Database (NVD), which is the main
CVE databases. Each vulnerability represents a
threat until a patch is written by the developers.
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Patch for CVE-2009-4004
unsigned bank_num = mcg_cap & 0xff,
bank;
r = -EINVAL;
- if (!bank_num)
+ if (!bank_num || bank_num >=
KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS)
goto out;
if (mcg_cap & ˜(KVM_MCE_CAP_SUPPORTED
| 0xff | 0xff0000))
goto out;
Patch for CVE-2016-8658
(u8 *)&settings->beacon.head[
ie_offset],
settings->beacon.head_len -
ie_offset,
WLAN_EID_SSID);
- if (!ssid_ie)
+ if (!ssid_ie || ssid_ie->len >
IEEE80211_MAX_SSID_LEN)
return -EINVAL;
memcpy(ssid_le.SSID, ssid_ie->data,
ssid_ie->len);
Listing 1: Patch for CVE-2009-4004 and CVE-
2016-8658, the developers added a boundary
check in both cases.
There are many available patches fixing a
given kind of vulnerability. Let us consider
CVE category ‘Improper Restriction of Opera-
tions within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer’:
CVE-2009-4004 and CVE-2016-8658 are both
vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel, published in
the NVD in Nov 2009 and Oct 2016 respectively.
The corresponding patches to fix them are shown
in Listing 1. Both vulnerabilities are fixed by
adding a check on the memory boundary.
Considering that millions of commits are pub-
licly available on open-source projects, we as-
sume we have enough data to build a system
that would learn from past commits, and use it
to predict patches for new vulnerabilities. This
is the contribution of this article, we present a
novel and original approach for learning how
to automatically generate patches for security
vulnerabilities.
We use a powerful machine learning
technique called sequence-to-sequence learning
(seq2seq). Seq2seq learns the mapping between
a sequence of tokens to another sequence.
It is heavily used to automatically translate
between different human languages (think
Google Translate) and has pushed forward the
state-of-the-art performance there. For machine
translation, the training data for the seq2seq
model consists of a corpus of pairs of sentences,
e.g., sentences in English and the corresponding
translation in French. To train seq2seq for
software vulnerability repair, we need such a
corpus, but for source code.
In this work, we have collected a dataset con-
sisting of 21 million bug fix commits on GitHub
from 2017 and 2018. The collected dataset is used
to train a seq2seq model. To assess the effective-
ness of the trained model, we collected real-world
CVE vulnerabilities from four well-known open-
source projects: Linux kernel, OpenSSL, systemd,
and Wireshark. Our results show the promise
of using seq2seq for fixing vulnerabilities, with
26.7%, 13.7% and 9.2% accuracy for fixing vul-
nerable functions of different sizes.
Notably, our approach is fully generic, instead
of focusing on one particular kind of vulnerability
such as buffer overflow [2]. Compared to the
related work, we evaluate our technique on a
large number of real vulnerabilities found in CVE
databases, not on synthetic code [3] or on manu-
ally collected benchmark [4]. To our knowledge,
our experiment involves the largest ever training
dataset for AI on code.
In summary, our contributions are:
• We mine two years of bug fixes from
GitHub, and we share the largest dataset for
machine learning on code changes (21 mil-
lion bug fix commits with 910 000 commits
related to C).
• We successfully train a seq2seq model using
the byte pair encoding to address the size of
the vocabulary in source code, which reaches
6 million different words in our dataset.
• We report original results on real-world
vulnerability fixing with machine learning,
14/630 vulnerabilities with CVE identifiers
can be fixed in a fully automated manner.
Sequence-to-sequence learning
Sequence-to-sequence (seq2seq) learning is a
modern machine learning framework that is used
to learn the mapping between two sequences,
typically of words [5]. It is widely used in
automated translation, text summarization and
other tasks related to natural language. A seq2seq
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model consists of two parts, an encoder and a
decoder. The encoder maps the input sequence
X = (x0, x1, ..., xn) to an intermediate continu-
ous representation H = (h0, h1, ..., hn). Then,
given H , the decoder generates the output se-
quence Y = (y0, y1, ..., ym). Note that the size
of the input and output sequences, n and m, can
be different. A seq2seq model is optimized on
a training dataset to maximize the conditional
probability of p(Y | X), which is equivalent to:
p(Y | X) = p(y0, y1, ..., ym | x0, x1, ..., xn)
=
m∏
i=0
p(yi | H, y0, y1, ..., yi−1)
Prior work has shown that source code is as
natural as human language [6], and techniques
used in natural language processing have been
demonstrated to work well on source code, in-
cluding seq2seq learning [7]. In our work, we
use a seq2seq model called “transformer” [8]. The
transformer model is the state-of-the-art architec-
ture for seq2seq learning.
Rare words in source code
One of the main challenges of using the
seq2seq model on source code is that it hardly
handles very rare words [9]. The problem is that
rare words, such as original literals or domain-
specific identifiers, are too uncommon or even
non-existent in the collected training data, and
hence cannot be used when decoding. Indeed, in
source code, rare variable and function names are
more common compared to human language. A
basic technique to handle the rare word problem
is to increase the vocabulary size, say from 10k
to 50k, but this is only a workaround: there will
always be rare words for which not enough data
is available at training time.
However, a rare word may have subwords that
are frequent. For example the word underworld
might be a rare word, but the subwords, under
and world are common words. So if we could
represent our vocabulary with frequent subwords,
then we could generate any word with it. Byte
pair encoding (BPE) is the state-of-the-art tech-
nique for learning the most frequent subwords
[10]. BPE starts with the basic characters as the
vocabulary (e.g., the letters in the Latin alphabet).
At each time step, the most frequent subword
pair is combined into one new subword, and it
is added into the vocabulary. It continues until
we have reached a predefined vocabulary size.
Listing 2 shows an example of applying BPE on
a C function. Variables like destroyKeyValuePair
and freeValue are considered as respectively 4
subwords and 2 subwords (destroy Key Value Pair
and free Value), which are more common words
that can be expected to be found in other code
snippets. BPE has been successfully used in ma-
chine translation [10] and source code modeling
[11]. In this paper, we are the first to report on
using seq2seq with BPE for patch generation.
C code
void destroyKeyValuePair(keyValuePair
kvPair) {
kvPair -> freeValue(kvPair -> value);
kvPair -> freeKey(kvPair -> key);
free(kvPair);
}
After applying BPE
_void _destroy Key Value Pair _( _key
Value Pair _kv Pair _) _{ _kv Pair _->
_free Value _( _kv Pair _-> _value _) _;
_kv Pair _-> _free Key _( _kv Pair _->
_key _) _; _free _( _kv Pair _) _; _}
Listing 2: Example of applying learned BPE on
a C function. ” ”(U+2581) indicates the start of
a new word. BPE learned some useful subwords
such as Key, Value and Pair.
Data collection and filtering
Training dataset. To train a seq2seq model,
we need a large corpus of buggy and fixed
source code. We create such a corpus by mining
the GitHub development platform. We use GH
Archive [12] to download all GitHub events that
happened between 2017-01-01 and 2018-12-31.
These events can be triggered by a Github issue
creation, an opened pull request, and other devel-
opment activities. In our case, we focus on push
events, which are triggered when a commit is
pushed to a repository branch. To only collect bug
fix commits, we adopt a keyword-based heuristic
[13]: if the commit message contains keywords
(fix OR solve OR repair) AND (bug OR issue OR
problem OR error OR fault OR vulnerability),
we consider it a bug fix commit and add it
to our corpus. In total, we have analyzed 730
million commits and selected 21 million commits
identified as bug fix commits.
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In our experiment, we focus on C code as
the target programming language for automatic
repair. Therefore we further filter the bug fix
commits based on the file extension. We remove
commits that did not fix any file that ends with
’.c’, this leaves us with 910 000 buggy C com-
mits. Then, for each commit, we extract function
pairs that were changed in the commit. We are
learning function-level changes instead of file-
level changes because seq2seq suffers from long
input and output [14]. To identify function-level
changes, we use the GNU compiler preprocessor
to remove all comments, and we only extract
functions that are changed. Then, we used Clang
to parse and tokenize the function source code.
In the end, we obtain 1 806 879 function-level
changes, reduced to 642 399 after removing dupli-
cates. The sizes of functions vary and we observe
some C functions are still too big to be learned
with seq2seq. Therefore, we further divide the
training dataset to d200, d100, and d50, where the
function lengths in before and after the change are
limited to 200, 100 and 50 tokens respectively. In
d200, d100, and d50, we have 299 976, 146 051,
and 49 340 function-level changes respectively.
The function code before the change is used as
input to the seq2seq model, and the function after
the change is used as the ground truth output for
training.
Testing dataset. We also collect a dataset for
testing the ability of seq2seq to fix real vulnera-
bilities. We used Data7 [15] to collect known vul-
nerabilities with CVE identifier from four well-
known projects: Linux kernel, OpenSSL, sys-
temd, and Wireshark. Each sample in the testing
dataset consists of a CVE number and a list of
commits that fixed the vulnerability. Next, we
extract function-level changes from these vulner-
abilities, and we call them vulnerable functions.
We consider a vulnerability to be completely
fixed if all its vulnerable functions are fixed. A
vulnerability is partly fixed if at least one of its
vulnerable functions is fixed. Test sets t200, t100,
and t50 are created by including only vulnerable
functions where the token lengths before and after
the change are limited to 200, 100, and 50 tokens
respectively. For t200, we have 1615 vulnerable
functions, that represent 630 vulnerabilities. For
t100, we have 725 vulnerable functions, that rep-
resent 288 vulnerabilities. For t50, we have 120
vulnerable functions spread over 85 vulnerabili-
ties.
Experiment setup
The training datasets d200, d100, and d50 are
randomly divided into training data and validation
data, with 98% as training and 2% as validation.
We select the best models with the highest valida-
tion accuracy a grid search in the hyper-parameter
space. We evaluate the resulting models on our
testing datasets, t200, t100 and t50. We train three
baseline seq2seq models on the three datasets
d200, d100 and d50 with a vocabulary set to the top
50k most common tokens. Those baselines rep-
resent the state-of-the-art seq2seq model, without
specific care to address the rare word problem.
Next, we explore seq2seq models using BPE
for handling rare tokens. For the BPE configura-
tion, we set the size of subword vocabularies to
either 1000, 5000 or 10000, i.e., the vocabulary
is the top 1000, 5000 or 10000 most frequent
subwords in source code identifiers. After having
identifier the optimal BPE subvocabulary, we
traing the seq2seq models our training dataset
d200, d100 and d50. Consequently, in addition to
our baselines, we have nine different settings:
the cross-product of three different token length
limits and the three different vocabularies defined
by BPE. In total, we have 12 different seq2seq
models summarized in Table 1. The seq2seq
model are called after the training dataset and the
BPE configuration: for example BPE1000−d200
refers to the seq2seq model trained on d200 and
with vocabulary set to the top 1k most common
subwords.
The best model for all 12 different settings
is evaluated on the corresponding testing dataset:
Baseline−d200 is evaluated on t200, BPE1000−
d100 is evaluated on t100, etc. We use beam
search to predict fixes of vulnerable functions
which means that the seq2seq model generates
the top 50 most likely predictions per vulnerable
function. The vulnerable function is considered
as fixed when one of 50 predictions matches the
ground truth human fix, as done in prior work [7],
[16].
We use the OpenNMT-tf [17] for training the
transformer model, and SentencePiece [18] for
learning BPE on the training data.
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Experimental Results
Can the trained seq2seq models generate
patches for real-world vulnerabilities? The main
results are presented in Table 1. The first col-
umn gives the name of seq2seq model depending
on its BPE configuration. The second column
shows the prediction accuracy on t50, t100 and
t200 respectively. The third column displays the
number of partly fixed vulnerabilities. The fourth
column represents the number of completely fixed
vulnerabilities.
We first focus on the number of C functions
with vulnerabilities that are correctly patched by
our system. Overall, our model is able to fix
real world vulnerabilities, up to 32/120 (26%)
for vulnerabilities in small C functions of less
than 50 tokens. The seq2seq model’s performance
decreases with the input and output length: the
values on the d50 models (first group of four
rows) are higher than those for the bigger func-
tions: it is easier to fix vulnerabilities in shorter
C functions.
Recall that the Baseline models do not use
BPE, and Table 1 indicates that their accuracies
are close to 0. This shows that a standard seq2seq
model with a fixed vocabulary is not an option
for handling the rare token problem. To further
analyze this phenomenon, we analyzed the 80 750
predictions generated by Baseline−d200 (1 615
vulnerable functions in t200 × 50 predictions per
function). We found that 80 047 / 80 346 (99%)
predictions contain out-of-vocabulary tokens, this
further confirms the prevalence of rare words in
source code. Now, our results show that byte-
pair encoding (BPE) is a powerful solution to
this problem: the number of fixed C functions
jumps from 5 to 32 for small functions (d50)
and from 0 to 148 for larger functions (d200).
Our data suggests that for large functions, there
is still some room for improvement with large
subword vocabulary (a subword vocabulary of
20000 would likely increase the accuracy).
Recall that a single vulnerability is often fixed
in multiple functions at once. The third and fourth
columns of Table 1 focus on the number of fixed
vulnerabilities instead of the number of fixed vul-
nerable functions. Our seq2seq models are able to
partially fix up to 22/85 vulnerabilities in small
functions. Completely fixing a vulnerability is
much harder, because all the functions inside the
vulnerability must be fixed: for instance in CVE-
2011-1771, the fix is done over 95 vulnerable
functions. Despite this strong requirement, our
approach is able to completely fix 3/85 vulner-
abilities in t50, 10/288 vulnerabilities in t100, and
14/630 vulnerabilities in t200. To our knowledge,
this is the first report of result with seq2seq
learning on fixing general vulnerabilities.
The results of seq2seq models are computed
based on the ground truth human fix. In produc-
tion, such a vulnerability fixing system would
be used without a ground truth fix. Based on
the suspicious functions, we would filter the out-
put of seq2seq using additional checks: such as
compilation (remove uncompilable code) and test
execution (remove patches yielding test failures).
Previous work has shown that using these auto-
matic filtering techniques correctly filters out up
to 97% of the patches generated with seq2seq [7].
Case studies
int cifs_close(struct inode *inode,
struct file *file)
{
- cifsFileInfo_put(file->private_data);
- file->private_data = NULL;
+ if (file->private_data != NULL) {
+ cifsFileInfo_put(file->private_data
);
+ file->private_data = NULL;
+ }
/* return code from the ->release op
is always ignored */
return 0;
Listing 3: CVE-2011-1771 is successfully fixed
by seq2seq.
Let us now discuss interesting cases. CVE-
2011-1771 is a vulnerability from the Linux
kernel, the description of this vulnerability from
NVD is: The cifs close function in fs/cifs/file.c
in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 allows local
users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer
dereference and BUG) or possibly have unspeci-
fied other impact by setting the O DIRECT flag
during an attempt to open a file on a CIFS
filesystem. The human patch for this vulnerability
is shown in Listing 3. The fix consists of adding a
null check for variable private data. Our seq2seq
approach is able to generate this exact patch
(4 out of 12 models can do so: BPE1000 −
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Model Fixed functions
Vulnerabilities
Partially fixed Completely fixed
Baseline− d50 5/120 (4.2%) 3/85 (3.5%) 1/85 (1.2%)
BPE1000 − d50 26/120 (21.7%) 17/85 (20%) 3/85 (3.5%)
BPE5000 − d50 32/120 (26.7%) 22/85 (25.9%) 3/85 (3.5%)
BPE10000 − d50 28/120 (23.3%) 18/85 (21.1%) 3/85 (3.5%)
Baseline− d100 2/725 (0.3%) 2/288 (0.7%) 0/288 (0%)
BPE1000 − d100 68/725 (9.4%) 40/288 (13.9%) 6/288 (2.1%)
BPE5000 − d100 97/725 (13.4%) 47/288 (16.3%) 5/288 (1.7%)
BPE10000 − d100 99/725 (13.7%) 45/288 (15.6%) 10/288 (3.5%)
Baseline− d200 0/1615 (0%) 0/630 (0%) 0/630 (0%)
BPE1000 − d200 109/1615 (6.7%) 45/630 (7.1%) 9/630 (1.4%)
BPE5000 − d200 131/1615 (8.1%) 52/630 (8.3%) 9/630 (1.4%)
BPE10000 − d200 148/1615 (9.2%) 55/630 (8.7%) 14/630 (2.2%)
Table 1: Performance of our trained seq2seq models on the testing datasets. The first column gives
the kind of seq2seq model. The second column shows the accuracy on t50, t100 and t200 respectively.
The third column displays the number of partly fixed vulnerabilities. The fourth column represents
the number of completely fixed vulnerabilities.
d50, BPE10000 − d100, BPE1000 − d100 and
BPE1000 − d200).
static int omninet_open(struct tty_struct
*tty, struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
- struct usb_serial *serial = port->
serial;
- struct usb_serial_port *wport;
-
- wport = serial->port[1];
- tty_port_tty_set(&wport->port, tty);
-
return usb_serial_generic_open(tty,
port);
}
Listing 4: CVE-2017-8925 is successfully fixed
by seq2seq.
CVE-2017-8925 is another vulnerability from
the Linux kernel, the description from NVD is:
The omninet open function in drivers/usb/seri-
al/omninet.c in the Linux kernel before 4.10.4
allows local users to cause a denial of service
(tty exhaustion) by leveraging reference count
mishandling. It is categorized as ‘Improper Re-
source Shutdown or Release’. The human fix
shown in Listing 4 removes statements that im-
properly handle variables ‘port’ and ‘tty’. This
exact patch could be generated by all our seq2seq
models trained on d100 and d200. With appropriate
training data, our seq2seq approach to generate
vulnerability fixes is able to predict the same
patches as human developers.
Conclusion
Software vulnerabilities are common and can
cause much damage. In this paper, we took a
step towards automatic repair of security vulner-
abilities. We devised, implemented and evaluated
a novel system based on sequence-to-sequence
learning on past commits from software reposi-
tories. We mined 2 years of commit history from
GitHub, and we solved the rare word problem
in source code by using the byte-pair encoding
technique. Our original results show that real
world vulnerable C functions can be fixed in
a fully automated, data-driven manner. Future
work is required to increase the performance of
automatic vulnerability tools on fixing general
vulnerabilities, and to explore the integration of
such technology into the software development
process.
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